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Judicial District Court - Kootenai Co 
ROA. Report 
Case: CV-2011-0003947 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Karl L Roesch, etal. vs. Daniel L Klemann, etal. 
User: VIGIL 
Karl L Roesch, River Terrace Estates vs. Daniel L Klemann, Cornerstone Financial Inc, Shea Realtors PLLC 
Date Code User Judge 
5/16/2011 NCOC HUFFMAN New Case Filed - Other Claims John T. Mitchell 
HUFFMAN Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type John T. Mitchell 
not listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Finney, John A. (attorney for 
Roesch, Karl L) Receipt number: 0020969 
Dated: 5/16/2011 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
Roesch, Karl L (plaintiff) 
HUFFMAN Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And John T. Mitchell 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Finney Receipt number: 0020974 Dated: 
5/16/2011 Amount: $3.00 (Check) 
SUMI VICTORIN Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
LISP VICTORIN Us Pendens John T. Mitchell 
6/30/2011 AFSV BAXLEY Proof Of Service that on 06107/11 Shea Realtors John T. Mitchell 
was served by leaving with Gary Shae 
Registered Agent 
7/11/2011 APPL SREED Application for Clerk's Entry of Default John T. Mitchell 
AFSV BAXLEY Proof Of Service on 06/22/11 served DLK John T. Mitchell 
7/1912011 SREED Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And John T. Mitchell 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: John Finney Receipt number: 0030416 
Dated: 7/19/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
SREED Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same John T. Mitchell 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
John Finney Receipt number: 0030416 Dated: 
7/19/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
EODF L/SONBEE Entry of Default- Shea Realtors John T. Mitchell 
JDMT L/SONBEE Judgment (Partial) John T. Mitchell 
8/1/2011 AFNM LEU Affidavit Of Non-military Service John T. Mitchell 
APPL LEU Application For Clerk's Entry Of Default John T. Mitchell 
8/4/2011 RTSV ROSENBUSCH Return Of Non-Service/R.C.lService attempted John T. Mitchell 
07-27-11 
8/5/2011 EODF SREED Entry of Default John T. Mitchell 
8/9/2011 ACKS ROSENBUSCH Acknowledgement Of Service John T. Mitchell 
8/23/2011 SREED Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And John T. Mitchell 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: John A Finney Receipt number: 0035872 
Dated: 8/23/2011 Amount: $2.50 (Check) 
SREED Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same John T. Mitchell 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
John A Finney Receipt number: 0035872 Dated: 
8/23/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
STIP VIGIL Stipulation to Entry of Judgment John T. Mitchell 
MEMO VIGIL Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and John T. Mitchell 
Costs 
Date: 5/10/2012 
Time: 05:28 PM 
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JUdicial District Court - Kootenai C 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0003947 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Karl L Roesch, etal. vs. Daniel L Klemann, etal. 
User: VIGIL 
Karl L Roesch, River Terrace Estates vs. Daniel L Klemann, Cornerstone Financial Inc, Shea Realtors PLLC 
Date Code User Judge 
8/23/2011 AFFD VIGIL Affidavit of Amount Due John T. Mitchell 
8/30/2011 CVDI CLEVELAND Civil Disposition entered for: Cornerstone John T. Mitchell 
Financial Inc, Defendant; Klemann, Daniel L, 
Defendant; Shea Realtors PLLC, Defendant; 
River Terrace Estates, Plaintiff; Roesch, Karl L, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 8/30/2011 
FJDE CLEVELAND Judgment and Decree of Sale John 1. Mitchell 
STAT CLEVELAND Case status changed: Closed John T. Mitchell 
9/812011 ZOOK Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid John 1. Mitchell 
by: Finney, Finney & Finney Receipt number: 
0038176 Dated: 9/8/2011 Amount: $2.00 
(Check) 
9/13/2011 WRIT ZOOK Writ Issued 1 $307,800.62 John T. Mitchell 
12/12/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/201202:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Writ of Mandamus; John Finney 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
12/14/2011 PETN ZOOK Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff John T. Mitchell 
and Notice of Hearing 
1/1812012 MISC CRUMPACKER Response to Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of John T. Mitchell 
Mandamus to Compel Sheriff & Notice of Hearing 
AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Darrin L Murphey John T. Mitchell 
1/31/2012 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
01/31/201202:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: JUliE FOLAND 
3/1412012 ORDR CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Writ of Mandamus 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed John T. Mitchell 
3/21/2012 ORDR VICTORIN Amended Judgment and Decree of Sale John 1. Mitchell 
WRIT VICTORIN Amended Writ of Execution for Sale of Real John T. Mitchell 
Property 
3/27/2012 DEGLMAN Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John T. Mitchell 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Finney, John A. 
(attorney for Roesch, Karl L) Receipt number: 
0013538 Dated: 3/27/2012 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Roesch, Karl L (plaintiff) 
BNDC DEGLMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 13540 Dated John 1. Mitchell 
3/27/2012 for 100.00) 
STAT DEGLMAN Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
BNDC DEGLMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 13542 Dated John T. Mitchell 
3/27/2012 for 200.00) 
APDC VIGIL Appeal Filed In District Court John T. Mitchell 
STAT VIGIL Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
4/3/2012 MISC VIGIL Clerk's Certificate of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Date: 5/10/2012 
Time: 05:28 PM 
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Fi udicial District Court - Kootenai Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0003947 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Karl L Roesch, etal. vs. Daniel L Klemann, etal. 
User: VIGIL 
Karl L Roesch, River Terrace Estates vs. Daniel L Klemann, Cornerstone Financial Inc, Shea Realtors PLLC 
Date Code User Judge 
4/26/2012 NLTR VIGIL Notice of Lodging Transcript (22 Pages julie John T. Mitchell 
Foland) 
BNDV VIGIL Bond Converted (Transaction number 1036 John T. Mitchell 
dated 4/26/2012 amount 71.50) 
BNDV VIGIL Bond Converted (Transaction number 1037 John T. Mitchell 
dated 4/26/2012 amount 128.50) 
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Case No. CV-2011- 3 911 
COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: A 
Fee: $88.00 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and for a cause(s) of action, plead 
and allege, as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided 77.5% 
interest, and RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC., as to an undivided 
22.5% interest, pursuant to an Assignment Of Real Estate Mortgage 
And Negotiation Of Promissory Note, recorded April 12, 2011 as 
Instrument No. 239493000, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, are 
COMPLAINT - 1 
1 
the holders of a Promissory Note (herein "Note"), dated February 
13, 2006 in the original principal sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND 00/100 ($200,000.00). 
2. The Plaintiffs are the Mortgagees pursuant to a Real 
Estate Mortgage (herein "Mortgage") recorded February 15, 2006 as 
Instrument No. 2013767, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, 
concerning the following described real property (herein "Real 
Property") : 
A PORTION OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 5, TOWNSHIP 47 
NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, BOISE MERIDIAN, KOOTENAI COUNTY, 
IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1558 FEET (MORE OR LESS) WEST OF 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2 OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET MORE OR LESS TO A POINT ON THE 
SOUTH SIDE OF COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS 
IT FROM THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE METZ ROAD TO 
THE EAST AND WEST QUARTER LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE WEST ALONG THE QUARTER LINE TO THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE WEST LINE OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER AND CONTINUING ALONG 
THE WEST LINE OF LOT 3 OF SAID SECTION 5 TO THE NORTH 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG SAID NORTH LINE OF SAID LOT 3, 1082 
FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE CENTER LINE OF THE NORTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5, A DISTANCE OF 2538.6 FEET, 
MORE OR LESS; 
THENCE WEST 1558 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF 
THE COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS IT FROM 
THE SOUTH; 
COMPLAINT - 2 
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THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE EAST SIDE OF 
THE METZ ROAD TO A POINT ON THE EAST AND WEST CENTER 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG THE SAID CENTERLINE 1174 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS, TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY THE EAST 
720 FEET THEREOF. 
ALSO EXCEPT THAT PORTION LYING WEST OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED LINE: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF 
SECTION 5, THAT IS 1931.38 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 18'59" 
EAST FROM THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5, 
MARKED BY AN OLD RECOGNIZED 1 INCH IRON PIPE; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 04' 44" WEST, 2657.44 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE NORTH BOUNDARY OF SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 55' 48" EAST, 437. 00 FEET TO THE 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING OF THE HEREIN DESCRIBED LINE; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 04' 40" WEST, 2663.19 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF THE SECTION AND THE 
TERMINUS OF SAID LINE. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP 80 FEET WIDE OVER PART OF THE EAST 
HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER, walCH WAS DEEDED TO THE 
STATE OP IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED 
FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT PAGE 241. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP OF VARIABLE WIDTH OVER PART OF LOT 3, 
THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER AND LOT 2, 
walCH WAS DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT 
PAGE 242. 
3. The Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, is 
the maker of said Note and the Mortgagor of said Mortgage. 
4. The Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. is a 
mortgagee regarding said real property pursuant to that certain 
Real Estate Mortgage recorded February 15, 2006 as Instrument No. 
COMPLAINT - 3 
3 
, ' 
2013768, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, concerning the Rea1 
Property. 
5. The Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC is a mortgagee 
regarding said rea1 property pursuant to that certain Mortgage 
recorded February 6, 2009 as Instrument No. 2195718000, records 
of Kootenai County, Idaho, concerning the Rea1 Property. 
6. The Court has in rem jurisdiction, as this is a 
forec1osure action invo1ving rea1 property 10cated in Kootenai 
County, Idaho. 
7. The Court has in personam jurisdiction over each of the 
Defendants. 
8. The genera1 a11egations of damages and the re1ief 
sought by the P1aintiffs meets the District Court's 
jurisdictiona1 requirements. 
9. The Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, has 
fai1ed, neg1ected, or refused to make the schedu1ed payments on 
the Note to the P1aintiffs, and is in defau1t. 
10. The P1aintiffs e1ect to acce1erate the entire 
indebtedness in fu11 due pursuant to the Note. 
11. By virtue of the Note, the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, 
an unmarried man, is indebted to the P1aintiffs for the remaining 
principa1 ba1ance in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 
NO/100 ($200,000.00) as of Apri1 1, 2008, p1us interest accruing 
at the rate of FIFTEEN PERCENT (15.0%) per annum from Apri1 1, 
2008. 
COMPLAINT - 4 
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12. By virtue of the Note, the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, 
an unmarried man, is further indebted to the P1aintiffs for 
accrued and unpaid interest, and escrow fees. 
13. By virtue of the above Note and the Mortgage the 
Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, is further 
responsib1e for the costs and fees of foreclosure, inc1uding, but 
not limited to, title insurance, court costs, service costs, 
attorney fees, execution fees, and all other sums reasonably 
expended to protect or recover the security. 
14. The P1aintiffs are fi1ing a 1is pendens giving notice 
of this action. 
15. The Plaintiffs are entit1ed to an adjudication of the 
amounts due pursuant to the Note and Mortgage, inc1uding interest 
on the unpaid principal balance at the rate of Fifteen Percent 
(15%) through the date of Sheriff's forec1osure sale. 
16. The P1aintiffs pursuant to the Mortgage have a priority 
security interest as of the date of recording of February 15, 
2006 in the Rea1 Property. 
17. The Plaintiffs' priority security interest has priority 
over any claims by the Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. 
18. The Plaintiffs' priority security interest has priority 
over any claims by the Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC. 
19. The Plaintiffs are entitled to an adjudication of the 
priority of their security interest pursuant to the Note and 
Mortgage and an adjudication dec1aring said security interest 
superior to any and all subsequent tit1eho1der's and/or 
1ienholder's rights, claims, and/or security interests, including 
COMPLAINT - 5 
5 
but not l~ited to the interest of the Defendant CORNERSTONE 
FINANCIAL, INC. and the Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, in the 
Real Property as inferior to that of the Plaintiffs. 
20. The Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees against 
the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, in the event 
of default, in a sum not exceeding SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 
00/100 ($6,000.00), or in the event of contest by the Defendant 
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, as the court deems 
reasonable and appropriate, pursuant to the Note and Mortgage, 
and/or Idaho Code §§ 6-402, 12-120, and/or 12-121. 
21. The Plaintiffs are entitled to costs against the 
Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man. 
22. The Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees against 
the Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. in the event of contest 
by the Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC., as the court deems 
reasonable and appropriate, pursuant to the Mortgage, and/or 
Idaho Code §§ 6-402 and/or 12-121. 
23. The Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees against 
the Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC in the event of contest by the 
Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, as the court deems reasonable and 
appropriate, pursuant to the Mortgage, and/or Idaho Code §§ 6-402 
and/or 12-121. 
24. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of sale of the 
Real Property upon a Sheriff's foreclosure sale, and upon becoming 
the successful bidder to have possession thereof subject only to 
the statutory provisions of redemption, and to have an application 
of the proceeds of sale to the payment of costs of the Court and 
COMPLAINT - 6 
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the expenses of sale, and then to the amount due the Plaintiffs 
through the date of sale, and in the event of a deficiency, for a 
money judgment against the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an 
unmarried man, pursuant to supplemental proceedings. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment as set forth 
above and upon notice pleading, and for any other relief that the 
court deems appropriate, upon law or in equity. 
~7-~1 HN A. FINNEY-
INNEYFINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF __ H_-_{ ____ ) 
L
· ) s.s. 
COUNTY OF __ I4_~_I_E __ ) 
I, KARL L. ROESCH first being duly sworn upon oath depose 
and say the following: 
I am a Plaintiff in this case and I have read the foregoing 
COMPLAINT, and know the contents therein stated and believe the 
same to be true. 
KARL L. ROESCH 
,flUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ! tJ day of t£t¥ ,2011. -
COMPLAINT - 7 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF 111 ---~----) //-7 ) s.s. 
COUNTY OF ---l::V~_~..;....?i£ ___ ) 
KARL L. ROESCH, President of RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC., 
first being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
I am the President of the Plaintiff corporation in this case 
and I have read the foregoing Complaint, and know the contents 
therein stated and believe the same to be true. 
RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC. 
By: KARL L. ROESCH 
Its: President 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
Hflv I 2011. 
If) day of 
7 
COMPLAINT - 8 
d ...... " ~ #\.., .;) 
N0tl\~ ~i~tate of .,..;.N:J.;..=== . ..... __ 
ResJ.dJ.ng'1s. t : .::!n\.'>u>o 8 
My Commission Expires: \ - {). q.=d£,.. 
KAREN J OELLWO 
NOTARY PUBLIC IorIh8 
Slate of MonIInB 
Residing at PelIOn. MonIInB 
My CommIaeIon Elqliw 
January ZO, 2016 
8 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
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Case No. CV-2011-3947 
JUDGMENT (PARTIAL) 
Based on the records, file, and pleadings herein, and based 
upon the default of the Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, a partial 
judgment is hereby ordered and adjudged in favor of the 
Plaintiffs against Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC as follows: 
1. The Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC's Mortgage recorded 
February 6, 2009 as Instrument No. 2195718000, records of Kootenai 
County, Idaho, concerning the Real Property subject matter herein, 
JUDGMENT (PARTIAL) - 1 
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is subsequent to and inferior to the interest of the Plaintiffs by 
the Real Estate Mortgage recorded February 15, 2006 as Instrument 
No. 2013767, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
DATED this \q~ day of ~~~~~~k,~------------ 2011. 
\1 ~,~U~ 
CLERK'S RULE 77 (d) SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the 
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the 
Mail, postage prepaid, this ~ day of _~k.d_ 2011, and 
JUDGMENT (PARTIAL) was served i: deposit incgzo rstn Cplass U. S . 
was addressed as follows: 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Gary Shea, Registered Agent 
Shea Realtors, PLLC 
1900 Harrison Avenue 
Butte, Montana 59701 
JUDGMENT (PARTIAL) - 2 
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ORIGI~~ 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
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Case No. CV-2011-3947 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SALE 
Based on the records, file, and pleadings herein, and based 
upon the default of the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried 
man, and pursuant to the Judgment (Partial) entered July 19, 2011 
and recorded July 21, 2011 as Instrument No. 2320867000 regarding 
Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, and pursuant to the Stipulation To 
Entry Of Judgment with the Receiver for the Defendant CORNERSTONE 
FINANCIAL, INC., Judgment is hereby ordered and decreed as 
follows: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SALE - 1 
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1. The Defendant, DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, is 
indebted to the Plaintiffs, KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided 
77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC., as to an 
undivided 22.5% interest (pursuant to an Assignment Of Real 
Estate Mortgage And Negotiation Of Promissory Note, recorded 
April 12, 2011 as Instrument No. 239493000, records of Kootenai 
County, Idaho) upon a Promissory Note (herein "Note"), dated 
February 13, 2006 in the original principal sum of TWO HUNDRED 
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 00/100 ($200,000.00), secured by Real Estate 
Mortgage (herein "Mortgage"), recorded February 15, 2006 as 
Instrument No. 2013767, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, for a 
total of $307,800.62 as of August 19, 2011 plus $82.192 per diem 
to date of Sheriff's foreclosure sale as a lien with a priority 
date of February 15, 2006, which is hereby foreclosed against the 
following real property (herein "Real Property") of the Defendant 
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man: 
A PORTION OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 5, TOWNSHIP 47 
NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, BOISE MERIDIAN, KOOTENAI COUNTY, 
IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1558 FEET (MORE OR LESS) WEST OF 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2 OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET MORE OR LESS TO A POINT ON THE 
SOUTH SIDE OF COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS 
IT FROM THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE METZ ROAD TO 
THE EAST AND WEST QUARTER LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE WEST ALONG THE QUARTER LINE TO THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE WEST LINE OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER AND CONTINUING ALONG 
THE WEST LINE OF LOT 3 OF SAID SECTION 5 TO THE NORTH 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SALE - 2 
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THENCE EAST ALONG SAID NORTH LINE OF SAID LOT 3, 1082 
FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE CENTER LINE OF THE NORTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5, A DISTANCE OF 2538.6 FEET, 
MORE OR LESS; 
THENCE WEST 1558 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF 
THE COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS IT FROM 
THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE EAST SIDE OF 
THE METZ ROAD TO A POINT ON THE EAST AND WEST CENTER 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG THE SAID CENTERLINE 1174 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS, TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY THE EAST 
720 FEET THEREOF. 
ALSO EXCEPT THAT PORTION LYING WEST OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED LINE: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF 
SECTION 5, THAT IS 1931.38 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 18'59" 
EAST FROM THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5, 
MARKED BY AN OLD RECOGNIZED 1 INCH IRON PIPE; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 04' 44" WEST, 2657.44 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE NORTH BOUNDARY OF SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 55' 48" EAST, 437. 00 FEET TO THE 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING OF THE HEREIN DESCRIBED LINE; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 04' 40" WEST, 2663.19 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF THE SECTION AND THE 
TERMINUS OF SAID LINE. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP 80 FEET WIDE OVER PART OF THE EAST 
HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER, walCH WAS DEEDED TO THE 
STATE OP IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED 
FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT PAGE 241. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP OF VARIABLE WIDTH OVER PART OF LOT 3, 
THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER AND LOT 2, 
walCH WAS DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY 
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PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT 
PAGE 242. 
2. The Plaintiffs' lien has priority over any right, 
title, cla~, interest, encumbrance, or liens recorded subsequent 
to it and any subsequent lien holder's rights, cla~s, and/or 
interests in the real property are inferior t,o that of the 
Plaintiffs' respective liens, specifically including the 
Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. and the Defendant SHEA 
REALTORS, PLLC. 
3. The Plaintiffs pursuant to the Mortgage have a first 
priority security interest as of the date of recording of 
February 15, 2006. 
4. The Plaintiffs are awarded a decree of sale of the Real 
Property with a priority date of February 15, 2006 upon the 
Mortgage, upon a Sheriff's foreclosure sale in the manner of an 
execution sale, and upon becoming the successful bidder(s) to 
have possession thereof subject only to the statutory provisions 
of redemption, and to have an application of the proceeds of sale 
to the payment of costs and expenses of sale, and then to the 
amount due the Plaintiffs, and then pursuant to statutory 
priority to the Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. and the 
Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, if any, and in the event of 
deficiency, for a money judgment against the Defendant DANIEL L. 
KLEMANN, an unmarried man. 
DATED this ..l!-fLaay of ..... ~~~ ...... J..... <.'-+-J.-___ _ 2011. 
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CLERK'S RULE 77 (d) SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the 
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SALE was served by deposit in First Class, 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ,3D day of B! J % 
2011, and was addressed as follows: 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Daniel Klemann 
284 E. River Rock Road 
Belgrade, Montana 59714 
Shea Realtors, PLLC 
c/o Gary Shea, Registered Agent 
1900 Harrison Avenue 
Butte, Montana 59701 
Cornerstone Financial, Inc. 
c/o Eric Nord, Receiver 
Crist, Krogh & Nord, LLC 
The Securities Building 
2708 First Avenue North, Suite 300 
Billings, Montana 59101 





JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
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Case No. CV-2011-3947 
WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR SALE OF 
REAL PROPERTY 
Fee: $2.00 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE SHERIFF OF KOOTENAI 
COUNTY, IDAHO, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 69, it appears from the 
records of the above entitl.ed Court that an Judgment And Decree 
Of Sale was dul.y made and entered in the District Court of the 
First Judicial. District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, on August 30, 2011, and recorded August 31, 
2011 as Instrument No. 2325820000, records of Kootenai County, 
Idaho, against the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, 
for the total sum of $307,800.62 as of August 19, 2011 pl.us 
WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY - 1 
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interest of $82.192 per day thereafter through the date of sale, 
with a priority date of February IS, 2006. 
The real property foreclosed upon is legally described as 
follows: 
A PORTION OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 5, TOWNSHIP 47 
NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, BOISE MERIDIAN, KOOTENAI COUNTY, 
IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1558 FEET (MORE OR LESS) WEST OF 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2 OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET MORE OR LESS TO A POINT ON THE 
SOUTH SIDE OF COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS 
IT FROM THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE METZ ROAD TO 
THE EAST AND WEST QUARTER LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE WEST ALONG THE QUARTER LINE TO THE SOUTHWEST 
CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE WEST LINE OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER AND CONTINUING ALONG 
THE WEST LINE OF LOT 3 OF SAID SECTION 5 TO THE NORTH 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG SAID NORTH LINE OF SAID LOT 3, 1082 
FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE CENTER LINE OF THE NORTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5, A DISTANCE OF 2538.6 FEET, 
MORE OR LESS; 
THENCE WEST 1558 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF 
THE COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS IT FROM 
THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE EAST SIDE OF 
THE METZ ROAD TO A POINT ON THE EAST AND WEST CENTER 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG THE SAID CENTERLINE 1174 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS, TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
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EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY THE EAST 
720 FEET THEREOF. 
ALSO EXCEPT THAT PORTION LYING WEST OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED LINE: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF 
SECTION 5, THAT IS 1931.38 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 18'59" 
EAST FROM THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5, 
MARKED BY AN OLD RECOGNIZED 1 INCH IRON PIPE; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 04' 44" WEST, 2657.44 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE NORTH BOUNDARY OF SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 55' 48" EAST, 437.00 FEET TO THE 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING OF THE HEREIN DESCRIBED LINE; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 04'40" WEST, 2663.19 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF THE SECTION AND THE 
TERMINUS OF SAID LINE. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP 80 FEET WIDE OVER PART OF THE EAST 
HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER, WHICH WAS DEEDED TO THE 
STATE OP IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED 
FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT PAGE 241. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP OF VARIABLE WIDTH OVER PART OF LOT 3, 
THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER AND LOT 2, 
WHICH WAS DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT 
PAGE 242. 
In the name of the State of Idaho, you are, therefore, 
hereby commanded that a Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale be conducted 
in the manner of an execution upon real estate for the sums due 
to the Plaintiffs, upon the priorities set forth above, to 
satisfy said Judgment, plus $2.00 for this Writ, plus your 
Sheriff's fees, and that you make legal service of this Writ and 
return at any time not less than ten (10) days nor more than 
sixty (60) days after your receipt of this execution. 
WITNESS My hand and official seal this /3 day of ~ 
2011. 
rJohn I Mitchell 
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JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
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Case No. CV-2011-3947 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
TO COMPEL SHERIFF 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, JOHN A. 
FINNEY, and petitions this Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus (or 
designated alternatively as a Writ of Mandate) to compel the 
Kootenai County Sheriff and the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
Department, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-302, to proceed with the 
decreed foreclosure sale, as follows: 
1. On August 30, 2011, this Court entered a Judgment And 
Decree of Sale which determined the amount due and owing on a 
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promissory note secured by real property as of a date certain plus 
interest still accruing on the note through the date of 
foreclosure sale. The Judgment further ordered that the 
foreclosure sale proceeds be applied to the note indebtedness. 
2. A Writ of Execution For Sale Of Real Property was 
issued September 13, 2011 which conformed to the decree. 
3. The decree conforms to applicable foreclosure law (both 
statutory and case law) . 
4. By letter dated September 15, 2011, Counsel for the 
Plaintiffs provided the requisite copies of the Judgment and the 
Writ and instructed the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department to 
complete the foreclosure sale pursuant to the decree and writ. 
Having received no response, Counsel for the Plaintiffs called the 
Kootenai County Sheriff's Department on October 14, 2011 and was 
told that "the interest rate is wrong," was cited to the case of 
Gro-Mor v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020 (1985) and asked to contact 
Counsel for the County. 
5. Counsel for the Plaintiffs attempted to address the 
situation with the Sheriff's Department and Counsel for the 
County, to no avail. 
6. By letter dated November 7, 2011, the Civil Division of 
the Kootenai County Prosecutor's office return foreclosure 
documents including the instructions and writ to Counsel for the 
Plaintiffs "on the grounds that the interest sought through the 
date of sale exceeds the lawful rate of interest the Sheriff can 
collect pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2)." A true and 
correct copy of the Deputy Prosecutor's November 7, 2011 letter is 
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attached (1 page - without enclosures) . 
7. The Sheriff Department's (and Prosecutor's) assertion 
regarding the calculation of the amount due through the date of 
foreclosure sale, specifically the accruing interest, is incorrect 
and contrary to law. 
8. Regarding the foreclosure of a deed of trust, Idaho 
Code § 45-1503 provides in relevant part (emphasis added) as 
follows: 
Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property 
is hereafter made to secure the performance of such an 
obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred upon the 
trustee to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for 
which such transfer is security, and a deed of trust 
executed in conformity with this act may be foreclosed by 
advertisement and sale in the manner hereinafter provided, 
or, at the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided 
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. 
9. The Deed of Trust statutes provide for judicial 
foreclosure as a mortgage. Regarding the foreclosure of mortgage, 
Idaho Code § 6-101(1) provides in relevant part (emphasis added) 
as follows: 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or 
the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real 
estate which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. In such action the court may, by 
its judgment, direct a sale of the incumbered property (or 
so much thereof as may be necessary) and the application of 
the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the costs of the 
court and the expenses of the sale, and the amount due to 
the plaintiff; and sales of real estate under judgments of 
foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption 
as in the case of sales under execution; (and if it appear 
from the sheriff's return that the proceeds are 
insufficient, and a balance still remains due, judgment can 
then be docketed for such balance against the defendant or 
defendants personally liable for the debt), and it becomes a 
lien on the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other 
cases on which execution may be issued. 
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10. The Sheriff's Departments assertion fails to recognize 
that in a foreclosure, the Court adjudicates the indebtedness and 
orders a sale of the security from which to apply the sale 
proceeds to the indebtedness. The indebtedness accrues interest 
pursuant to the debt instrument through sale. That is the "amount 
due the plaintiff." The Court's order to sell does not covert the 
indebtedness to a judgment upon which judgment interest accrues. 
11. Following the foreclosure sale, if a deficiency exists, 
the Court then proceeds with supplemental proceedings by which to 
adjudicate the deficiency judgment. It is not until the 
deficiency is adjudicated, that the "judgment interest" would 
apply. 
12. Idaho Code § 6-108 provides regarding deficiency 
judgments on a mortgage (emphasis added), as follows: 
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to 
enter a deficiency judgment in any case involving a 
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount 
greater than the difference between the mortgage 
indebtedness, as determined by the decree, plus costs of 
foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable value of the 
mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the 
decree upon the taking of evidence of such value. 
13. Similarly, for a deed of trust foreclosed non-
judicially, Idaho Code § 45-1512, regarding a money judgment by an 
action seeking a balance after a trustee' sale, provides (emphasis 
added) as follows: 
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of 
trust, as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be 
sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which 
such deed of trust was given as security, and in such action 
the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint the entire 
amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed of 
trust and the amount for which the same was sold and the 
fair market value at the date of sale, together with 
interest from such date of sale, costs of sale and 
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attorney's fees. Before rendering judgment the court shall 
find the fair market value of the real property sold at the 
time of sale. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the entire amount of indebtedness 
due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value at 
that time, with interest from date of sale, but in no event 
may the judgment exceed the difference between the amount 
for which such property was sold and the entire amount of 
the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. 
14. The Sheriff's Department's reliance upon the case of 
Gro-Mor v. Butts 109 Idaho at 1025, is misplaced. That case is 
not a foreclosure action, rather it is a breach of contract 
action. Its holding as to the rate of interest after a money 
judgment is entered is correct, since pre-judgment interest only 
accrues until the final personal money judgment is entered. The 
statutory rate of interest's application in a foreclosure action 
arises only after the foreclosure sale and supplemental 
proceedings. In a foreclosure, a final personal money judgment 
upon which the statutory rate of interest would then accrue is not 
entered until, if at all, proceedings held after the foreclosure 
sale and application of the sales proceeds (or the fair market 
value, whichever is greater) to the debt. Those post sale 
proceedings and the calculation of any remaining unpaid debt (if 
any) continues at the note rate of interest. Not until the 
deficiency personal money judgment is entered does the statutory 
rate of interest then accrue. The final "judgment" is not the 
decree of sale, but rather a personal judgment on deficiency, if 
needed. 
15. In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177 (1984) the Court 
ruled that in a judicial foreclosure proceeding on a deed of 
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trust, the trial court uses the judicial mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings (I.C. § 6-101 and 6-108) in the determination of 
deficiency judgment. That includes the application of the manner 
of determining the total amount of the indebtedness and the 
application of the sales proceeds or fair market value, to 
determine the deficiency due on the indebtedness, which becomes a 
personal money judgment. 
16. As set forth in Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 561 
(1926), "[a] decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is in no sense a 
personal judgment, and no personal judgment can be entered until 
after the foreclosure sale." This is because an adjudication of 
the amount due on an instrument of indebtedness is not a 
"judgment" upon which "judgment interest" then accrues. The 
adjudication of the amount due is necessary to hold the 
foreclosure sale. The deficiency, if any, is the personal 
judgment (upon which judgment interest accrues) . 
17. In Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 907, 910 
(1991), the Court held that "[t]he correct date for determining 
the value of the [property sold at foreclosure sale] would have 
been the date when the trial court in a foreclosure case 
determined whether a deficiency judgment should be entered 
pursuant to I.C. § 6-108." The Court went on to describe the 
method for determining the deficiency, which includes interest 
before sale date at the rate in the instrument of indebtedness. 
18. Alternatively, if the Court determines that the 
deficiency proceedings are pursuant to the deed of trust non-
judicial process, (rather than the mortgage foreclosure statutes), 
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the same resu1t is found. In Wilhe1m v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 
151 (2001) (citing Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132, 135 (1986» the 
Court of Appeals explained the deficiency process and how the 
deficiency is calculated on a non-judicial foreclosure. The first 
step is to continue the interest on the debt at the note rate 
through the date of foreclosure sale. Then the sales proceeds or 
fair market value (whichever is greater) is then applied. See 
also First National Bank of North Idaho v. Burgess, 118 Idaho 627 
(1990) and American Mutual Building & Loan v. Kesler, 64 Idaho 799 
(1943) for general descriptions of the foreclosure process, 
including the deficiency and interest calcu1ations. 
19. Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) is inapp1icable. 
20. In this matter, the Sheriff's Department needs to 
follow the judge's orders and my instructions to timely complete 
foreclosure sale. Foreclosure sales are not the same thing as a 
real property sale seeking to recover on a 1ien from a money 
judgment (whether based upon contract, tort, foreclosure 
deficiency judgment, or otherwise) . 
21. The duties and responsibility of the Sheriff's 
Department is not discretionary. By the decree and the writ, the 
Sheriff's Department is ordered and required to ~conduct a 
Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale for the sums due to the Plaintiff." 
The Plaintiff has a c1ear legal right to have the act performed; 
specifically the conduct of the sale with an app1ication of the 
proceeds to the amount due on the indebtedness. In addition, the 
Sheriff's Department has a c1ear duty to act, and the action is 
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ministerial in nature. There is no exercise of discretion 
necessary for the Sheriff's Department. 
22. As set forth in See Blumauer-Frank Drug Co. v. 
Branstetter, 4 Idaho 557 (1895), there is no discretion for the 
Sheriff's Department: 
We must not lose sight of the fact that process faire upon 
its face must be executed by the sheriff, upon its being 
placed in his hands. We hold the affidavit and notice to be 
process. No objection is made by the respondent from the 
for.m of the process. Therefore, the sheriff must execute it. 
The sheriff cannot be called upon, when he receives and 
execution, to sit in judgment upon the validity of the 
judgment. Neither can he, in this case, be called upon to 
sit in judgment on the validity of the mortgage. This is for 
the court, and not for the sheriff. 
23. In addition, the Sheriff's Department is liable for the 
failure to act. See generally Price v. Pace, 50 Idaho 353 (1931); 
Works v. Byram, 22 Idaho 794 (1912). 
24. It is incorrect and actionable for the Sheriff's 
Department to ignore the Court's order and writ, yet alone assert 
that from the date of decree of sale that the post judgment rate 
of interest applies. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus, compelling the Sheriff to conduct the foreclosure sale 
as decreed and as instructed. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above petition shall come for 
hearing before the Honorable John T. ~tchell on Janua;y 31, 2012 
at the hour of 2:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be 
heard, in a courtroom of the Kootenai County Courthouse, 324 W. 
Garden Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814. 
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DATED this ~ day of 2011. 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF BONNER ) 
I, JOHN A. FINNEY, attorney for the Plaintiffs, first being 
duly sworn upon oath depose and say the following: 
I am the Attorney for the Plaintiffs in this matter and I 
have read the foregoing Petition, and know the contents therein 
stated and believe the same to be true. 
to before 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and corr~ct copy of the foregoing 
was served by fax transmission this 17~day of December, 2011, 
and was addressed as follows: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor's 
Civil Division 
Attn: Darrin MUrphey 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Kootenai County Sheriff 
Attention: Civil Division 
P.o. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
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Daniel Klemann 
284 E. River Rock Road 
Belgrade, Montana 59714 
Shea Realtors, PLLC 
c/o Gary Shea, Registered Agent 
1900 Harrison Avenue 
Butte, Montana 59701 
Cornerstone Financial, Inc. 
c/o Eric Nord, Receiver 
Crist, Krogh & Nord, LLC 
The Securities Building 
2708 First Avenue North, Suite 
300 
Billings, Montana 59101 
BY:~-~~ 
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CRIMINAL DIVISION 




John A. Finney 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI COUNTY 
I)ROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BARRY McHUGH 
P.O. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816·9000 
November 7,2011 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
RE: Karl L. Roesch v. Daniel L. Klemann 
Case No. CV-11-3947 
David L. Reynolds v. Lowell Thomson 
Case no. CV-10-7920 
Dear John: 
CIVIL DIVISION 




The Kootenai County Sheriff's Department has asked the I return the enclosed 
Writs of Execution on the grounds that the interest sought through the date of sale 




Yours very truly, 
~(-
Darrin L. Murphey 
Civil Deputy Prosecutor 
cc: Barry Alleman, KCSD (w/encs.) 
H:\Sheri ffs Dcpartmcnt\Letters And Memos 20 II\Letter To 1. Finney 1 1-4-1 I.Docx 
lRES9!VED NOV 0 8 2011 
o vRIGINAL 
Barry McHugh 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Darrin L. Murphey, Civil Deputy, ISB #6221 
451 N. Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1620 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 
Attorney for Kootenai County Sheriff and 
Kootenai County Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided 77.5% 
interest, and RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, Case No. CV-11-3947 
INC., as to an undivided 22.5% interest, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man; 
CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC.; and 
SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL SHERIFF 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW, the Kootenai County Sheriff and the Kootenai County 
District Court Clerk, by and through their counsel of record, Darrin L. Murphey, 
Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and submits the following 
Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and 
Notice of Hearing: 
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The sole issue raised by Plaintiffs is whether the post judgment statutory 
rate of interest set forth in Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) applies to a decree or 
judgment in a judicial foreclosure. Plaintiffs argue that Idaho Code § 28-22-
104(2) is inapplicable. See Petition, p. 7, ,-r 19. Plaintiffs' argument is misplaced. 
Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"The legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of 
any competent court or tribunal shall be the rate of 5% plus 
the base rate in effect at the time of entry of judgment. ... " 
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 677 P.2d 490 (1984), a case cited 
by Plaintiffs, the Idaho Supreme Court held that interest on a mortgage 
foreclosure shall be calculated at the statutory rate of interest from the date of the 
decree, in accordance with the former Idaho Code § 28-22-104(4).1 
Finally, in computing the amount of the corrected 
deficiency judgment the district court should make 
calculations allowing accrued interest as follows. Interest 
will accrue on the total amount of the mortgage 
indebtedness, including foreclosure costs and attorney 
fees as determined by the decree of foreclosure, from 
March 11, 1981 [the date of the decree] to the date of the 
sale, April 1, 1981, at the statutory rate of eight percent 
per an-num in accordance with former I.C. § 28-22-104(4). 
See, e.g., Beeler v. American Trust Co., 28 Cal.2d 435, 170 
P.2d 439 (1946); Schmisseur v. Rebhan, 294 III.App. 172, 13 
N.E.2d 627 (1938) and Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton 
Gardens. Ltd., 88 N.J. 16, 438 A.2d 323 (1981). Compare 
Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian Inv., 60 
Hawaii 413, 591 P.2d 104 (1979). The amount of the 
mortgage indebtedness should be adjusted by deducting, as 
of the date of sale, (as determined in the decree of 
foreclosure), the "reasonable value" of the property. The 
I Former Idaho Code § 28-22-lO4(4) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 
interest is allowed at the rate of $.08 on the hundred by the year on: 
(4) money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal. 
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amount then remaining will continue to bear interest 
from the date of sale at the rate of eight percent per 
annum to the date the original deficiency judgment was 
entered, May 22, 1981. The total amount found due in 
the deficiency jUdgment, including allowable costs of 
the sale, if any. will thereafter bear interest at the 
applicable judgment rate. 
Thompson, 106 Idaho at 183-84, 677 P.2d at 496-97 (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Thompson, the rate of interest until the date of the decree of 
foreclosure, March 11, 1981, was calculated at the contract rate of 12% per 
annum ("prejudgment contract interest rate"). Id. at 178, 677 P .2d at 492. The 
rate of interest from the date of the decree of foreclosure to the date of sale, April 
1, 1981, was calculated at the then statutory rate of 8% per annum pursuant to 
former Idaho Code § 28-22-104(4) ("post judgment statutory interest rate"). Id. 
The rate of interest from the date of the sale to the date of the deficiency 
judgment, May 22, 1981, was then calculated at the post judgment statutory 
interest rate pursuant to former Idaho Code § 28-22-104(4). Id. at 106 Idaho at 
183-84, 677 P .2d at 496-97. The rate of interest from the date of the deficiency 
was then calculated at the post judgment statutory interest rate in effect at the 
time of the subsequent judgment. Id. at 106 Idaho at 184, 677 P .2d at 497. 
Here, Plaintiffs seek to have the Sheriff and Clerk collect interest at a rate 
interest in excess of the post judgment statutory interest rate set forth in Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104(2). As set forth in Thompson, the law in Idaho is clear, the 
rate of interest on a judicial foreclosure shall accrue from the date of the 
judgment or decree at the post judgment statutory interest rate in accordance 
with Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). None of the authorities cited by Plaintiffs 
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provide that Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) does not apply to a decree or judgment 
arising out of the judicial foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust. 
Judge Mitchell, Administrative Judge, previously addressed this issue with 
Plaintiffs' counsel by reassigning and amending several judgments to reflect that 
the post judgment statutory rate of interest was in accordance with Idaho Code § 
28-22-104(2). See Memorandum and Decision and Order dated June 1, 2010, 
attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of the undersigned counsel and 
correspondence from Judge Mitchell dated June 11, 2010, attached as Exhibit 
"B" to the affidavit of the undersigned counsel. The Sheriff and the Clerk have 
continued to follow the direction provided by Judge Mitchell. As such, Plaintiffs' 
Petition should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Kootenai County Sheriff and Kootenai County 
Clerk respectfully request that Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel 
Sheriff be denied. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2012. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
BY __ ~~ ____~~~=:)~-====-~ 
Darrin L. Murphey, Civil Deputy 
Attorney for Kootenai County Sheriff 
and Kootenai County Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January, 2012, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
[ U.S. Mail 
[ INTEROFFICE DELIVERY 
[ ] OVERNIGHT MAIL 
[ X ] TELEFAX (FAX) 
John A. Finney 
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 E. Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
BY~~ 
arriTlLMurphey 
H:\Sheriffs Department\Roesch V. Klemann - CV-11-3947\Response To Pits' Pet Writ Of Mandamus.Docx 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR A WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS 
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, ) 
CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC.; and ) 
SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, ) 
Defendants. ) --------------------------
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
At issue is what interest rate to apply to a Judgment and Decree of Sale. On 
August 30,2011, this Court entered a Judgment and Decree of Sale, prepared by 
plaintiffs' counsel, regarding the property at issue, based upon: the default of Daniel 
Klemann; the judgment entered regarding Shea Realtors; and the Stipulation to Entry of 
Judgment against Cornerstone Financial. Judgment and Decree of Sale, p. 1. The real 
property was foreclosed against and Judgment was entered in the amount of 
$307,800.62 ("as of August 19, 2011, plus $82.192 per diem to date of Sheriff's 
foreclosure sale as a lien with a priority date of February 15, 2006,"). Id., p. 2. In its 
September 13, 2011, Writ of Execution for Sale of Real Property, the Court similarly 
directed the Kootenai County Sheriff to conduct a Sheriff's Sale of the property given 
piaintiffs' $307,800.62 judgment, plus interest accruing at $82.192 per day through the 
date of the sale ... " Writ of Execution for Sale of Real Property, pp. 1-2. 
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As shown below, the Court was clearly in error for signing the Judgment and the 
Writ of Execution for Sale of Real Property, as presented by counsel for plaintiffs, 
because the daily interest amount to be applied to that Judgment and Writ is in both 
documents calculated using the incorrect rate of interest. Nowhere in either document 
does counsel for plaintiffs set forth the interest rate he used on the post-judgment daily 
interest amount he submitted to the Court. The Court admits it did not personally 
perform interest calculations to verify whether the figure presented by plaintiffs' counsel 
for the daily amount of interest ($82.192) was calculated by plaintiffs' counsel at the 
current rate of interest on judgments (5.250%) or the contract rate of interest (15%). 
Affidavit of Amount Due, p. 2, 112, 4. The Court made a significant error in trusting 
plaintiffs' counsel to calculate interest at the appropriate rate. 
The Court assumed that since the Judgment and the Writ in the present case 
were presented by the same plaintiffs' counsel who had previously appeared on behalf 
of all of the plaintiffs in the five related cases discussed below, surely the rate of interest 
would have been at the judgment rate of 5.250%. The Court erred in making that 
assumption. We all know what happens when we assume. 
In actuality, it is not only the interest rate in the Judgment and the Writ that are in 
error. Plaintiffs' counsel also erred in setting forth the amount of the underlying 
principal. In the Affidavit of Amount Due, the Judgment, and the Writ, counsel for 
plaintiffs states the underlying principal, to which post-judgment interest should attach, 
is $200,000.00, the original amount of the note, and not $307,800.62, the amount owed 
on the date of Judgment (the $200,000.00 note, plus interest at the contract rate of 
15% from April 1, 2008, to August 19, 2011, in the amount of $101,507.12, plus 
$533.00, plus $5,760.50). Affidavit of Amount Due, p. 2. Applying the correct interest 
rate (5.25%) to the correct judgment amount ($307,800.62) leaves a post-judgment 
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daily interest amount of $44.27. (5.25%x $307,800.62 = $16,159.53 divided by 365 = 
$44.27). Applying the incorrect interest rate (15%) to the incorrect principal amount of 
the note ($200,000.00) results in a daily rate of $82.92, which is what plaintiffs' counsel 
submitted in his Affidavit of Amount Due. 
It was the attorney for the Kootenai County Sheriff and Kootenai County Clerk of 
Court who caught the error made by this Court, based upon the documents submitted 
by plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel claims: "By letter dated November 7, 2011, the 
Civil Division of the Kootenai County Prosecutor's officer return foreclosure documents 
including the instructions and writ to Counsel for the Plaintiffs 'on the grounds that the 
interest sought through the date of sale exceeds the lawful rate of interest the Sheriff 
can collect pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2).'" Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 
Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 2,11 6. 
On December 14, 2011, plaintiffs filed this Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 
Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, asking this Court to compel the Sheriff to 
conduct the decreed foreclosure sale in light of the Sheriff's return of all foreclosure 
documents "on the grounds that the interest sought through the date of sale exceeds 
the lawful rate of interest the Sheriff can collect pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-
104(2)." Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 2. 
Plaintiffs' contention is ultimately that: "[t]he statutory rate of interest's application in a 
foreclosure action arises only after the foreclosure sale and supplemental proceedings." 
Id., p. 5. Plaintiffs argue the Sheriff's duties and responsibilities in this matter are not 
discretionary and "Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) is inapplicable." Id. p. 7. In response, 
the Sheriff argues a contract rate of interest applies until the date of the decree of 
foreclosure, the statutory rate in I.C. § 28-22-104(4)[the predecessor of I.C. § 28-22-
104(2)] applies from the date of the decree of foreclosure to the date of the sale, and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 37 Page 3 
the post-judgment statutory interest rate in effect at the time of any subsequent 
judgment applies from the date of the sale to the date of any deficiency judgment. 
Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of 
Hearing, p. 3. 
Immediately before (27 minutes before) the time set for oral argument on 
January 31, 2012, on plaintiffs' Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, this Court received a 
letter from plaintiffs' counsel faxed to the Court indicating that the matter had been 
resolved, the petition was being withdrawn, and the hearing was being vacated. This 
Court informed both plaintiffs' counsel and counsel for the Sheriff's Department the 
hearing would not be vacated and permitted plaintiffs' counsel to appear telephonically. 
Specifically, the Court wished to discuss with plaintiffs' counsel the fact that the interest 
amounts sought in plaintiffs' Writ of Mandamus were incorrect and in direct derogation 
of an Order issued by this Court in related cases on June 1, 2010 (in the Kootenai 
County cases of CV 2009 5323 (Ronan Telephone Co. Employee Profit Sharing Plan et 
al. v. Stacy Akana et al.,) CV 20095535 (Karl Roesch et al. v. Stacy Akana et al.), CV 
20097094 (Karl Roesch, et a/. v. Stacy Akana et a/.), CV 20097384 (Thomas H. 
Boone et al. v. Stacy Akana et al.), and CV 20099784 (Jack C. Downes et al v. Stacy 
Akana et al.)). After hearing plaintiffs' counsel's argument in support of the interest rate 
and calculations used, this Court took the matter under advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review for an appellate court's review of a district court's failure to 
issue a writ of mandate is the same standard required for the district court. Brady v. City 
of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 571, 944 P.2d 704, 706 (1997). The party seeking the writ 
of mandate must establish a "clear legal right to the relief sought." id. Additionally, the 
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writ will not issue where the petitioner has a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law." I.C. § 7-303. Almgren v. Idaho Department of Lands, 136 Idaho 
180,181,30 P.3d 958,959 (2001). The reviewing court defers to the district court's 
findings of fact supported by sUbstantial evidence and exercises free review of legal 
issues. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 110 Idaho 349, 351, 715 P.2d 
1019, 1021 (Ct.App. 1986). It is within the province of the district court to evaluate 
witness credibility and to weigh the evidence. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 
356, 815 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App. 1991). 
III. ANALYSIS. 
In Bouten Const. Co v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,992 P.2d 751 
(1999), the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
The rate of interest. .. is the rate set by the formula in I. C. § 28-
22-104(2). This statute provides that the legal rate of interest is 
arrived at by adding five percent to the base rate for the year. The 
base rate is determined each year by the State Treasurer on July 1, of 
each year. The base rate, when added to the statutory rate of five 
percent, equals the legal rate of interest for the succeeding year. 
Therefore the legal rate of interest to be applied to Bouten's award of 
January 1997, is the rate which was in effect on January 1, 1997. 
However, the question then becomes whether the interest rate for the 
balance owing should change if the interest rate changes the following 
year. 
The statute states that the interest rate should be applied "to all 
judgments declared during the succeeding twelve (12) month period." 
Id. (emphasis added). We resolve the question by a review of former 
amendments to the current statute. 
In 1987, I.C. § 28-22-104 was amended to change the previous 
fixed rate to a variable rate formula. The formula provides that the 
interest rate should be set on July 1 of each year. The new scheme 
provided a formula for yearly change, rather than the past method 
requiring an amendment to the statute to change the rate. 1987 Idaho 
See. Laws ch 278 § 7. 
In 1995, the statute was amended again. This time the 
legislature added the phrase "to all judgment declared or remaining 
unpaid." 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 34 § 1. This clearly shows the 
legislative intent that the new rate for the year should be applied to all 
judgments existing at the time of the change, not just the new ones 
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declared during the succeeding twelve months. This amendment 
created a variable interest rate that applied to all judgments entered 
after July 1, 1987. 
In 1996, the legislature again amended the statute, removing 
the words "or remaining unpaid". 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 94 § 1. 
This altered the statute to provide that the interest rate for the year 
shall be fixed for all new judgments declared during the year. Thus, 
the interest rate applied to the district court's 1997 decision will remain 
the same until the judgment is paid in full, regardless of how the 
interest rate fluctuated in future years. 
133 Idaho 756,764-65,992 P.2d 751,759-60. 
This Court has previously cited Bouten in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
of June 1, 2010, involving one of the instant parties (plaintiff Karl L. Roesch) and others, 
a decision in which the Court determined the interest rates in the various judgments and 
decrees of sale. June 1, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 2-3, Ronan 
Telephone Company, Employee Profit Sharing Plan, et al., v. Stacy Akana, and North 
Idaho Credit, Corp, Kootenai Case No. CV 2009 5323, Karl L. Roesch, and Carle S. 
Romey, v. Stacy Akana, and North Idaho Credit Crop., Kootenai County Case No. CV 
2009 5535, Karl L. Roesch, Ronan Telephone Company, Employee Profit Sharing Plan, 
et al., v. Stacy Akana and North Idaho Credit Corp., Kootenai County Case No. CV 
2009 7094, Thomas H. Boone, Trustee of Boone, Karlberg Employees Profit Sharing 
Plan, et al., v. Stacy Akana, and Roni Akana, North Idaho Credit Corp., Darrold Gene 
Rollman and Patricia Alice Rollman, TWROS, and K7B Investments, LLC, Kootenai 
County Case No. CV 20097384, and Jack C. Downes and Gaiil L. Downes, et. aI, v. 
Stacy Akana and North Idaho Credit Corp., Kootenai County Case No. CV 20099784; 
attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Darrin L. Murphey. 
That June 1, 2010, decision in those cases followed a status conference held in 
each of those cases on May 10, 2010. Oral argument was heard by the Court on that 
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date. Prior to that oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs in the instant case, the same 
counsel for all plaintiffs in those five related cases in 2010, offered only the following in 
support of plaintiffs' position: 
8. The statutory rate of interest on money due on a judgment by a 
Court does not apply until after the Sheriff's sale and after deficiency 
judgment proceedings, if any, are held pursuant Idaho Code § 6-108. If 
on the deficiency proceedings an amount of money due is set forth by 
judgment, that amount would accrue post judgment interest at the 
statutory rate on money due by court judgment. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV 2009 7094 (no similar pleading was filed in any of the other 
four related cases), Response to Administrative Judge Status Conference(s} and 
Request to Appear by Telephone, p. 3. However, nothing in Idaho Code § 6-108 
governs the time and methods upon which interest is fixed. Plaintiffs' counsel's 
argument in 2010 was simply that if the amount of the deficiency is not known, then the 
amount of judgment is not known, so the post-judgment interest rate should not apply; 
instead, the contract interest rate should apply until the amount of deficiency is 
determined. However, Idaho Code § 6-108 does not say that. That statute simply 
states a deficiency judgment cannot be for more than the difference between the 
mortgage indebtedness, plus the costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable 
value of the mortgaged property. At oral argument on May 1, 2009, the only case cited 
by counsel for plaintiffs in those five related cases, the same counsel as counsel for 
plaintiffs in the instant case, was Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 677 P .2d 490 
(1984). Specifically, counsel for plaintiffs told the Court headnotes 6 and 7 of that 
decision were "largely on point." However, both of those headnotes go right back to 
Idaho Code § 6-108, and they read: 
[6] Deficiency judgment entered following foreclosure and sale of 
property on second deed of trust was improper, as payments and 
advances made by holders of deed after entry of decree of foreclosure 
were included in the mortgage indebtedness. I.C. § 6-108. 
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[7] Fact that decree of foreclosure provides cutoff date for fixing 
amount of mortgage indebtedness does not preclude decree from setting 
forth a per diem amount of interest which will accrue from date of decree 
to date of sale, nor does it preclude adding costs of foreclosure sale in 
computing amount of any deficiency judgment. I.C. § 6-108. 
106 Idaho 177,677 P.2d 490. Again, plaintiffs' counsel's argument in 2010, based on 
Thompson, was that if the amount of the deficiency is not known, then the amount of 
judgment is not known, so the post-judgment interest rate should not apply. But 
nothing in Thompson says that. In fact, in the headnoted portion of Thompson, the 
Idaho Supreme Court indicates just the opposite. That portion, in its entirety, reads: 
We are persuaded by the Kirsches that the district judge erred by 
including in the mortgage indebtedness those payments and advances 
made by the Thompsons after the entry of the decree of foreclosure. 
Idaho Code § 6-108 requires the court to determine the amount of the 
mortgage indebtedness in the decree of foreclosure. The decree of 
foreclosure provides the cut off date for fixing the amount of the mortgage 
indebtedness. "The decree directing a sale of the premises should find 
the exact amount due on the mortgage and not leave this to be calculated 
by the office." FN2 L. JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 2042 at 493 (8th ed. 1928). 
FN2. This, of course, does not preclude the decree from 
setting forth a per diem amount of interest which will accrue 
from the date of the decree to date of sale. Also, it does not 
preclude adding costs of the foreclosure sale in computing 
the amount of any deficiency judgment. 
106 Idaho 177, 182-83,677 P.2d 490,495-96. The Court wonders if counsel for 
plaintiffs in the present case has ever read Thompson, either in 2010 or in 2012. 
Thompson makes it clear that interest on a mortgage foreclosure shall be calculated at 
the statutory rate from the date of the decree, not at the contract rate in the note as of 
the date of any later deficiency judgment. As pointed out by counsel for the Kootenai 
County Sheriff and Kootenai County Clerk of Court in the present case: 
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 677 P.2d 490 (1984), a 
case cited by Plaintiffs, the Idaho Supreme Court held that interest on a 
mortgage foreclosure shall be calculated at the statutory rate of interest 
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from the date of the decree, in accordance with the former Idaho Code § 
28-22-104(4}. 
Finally, in computing the amount of the corrected 
deficiency judgment the district court should make 
calculations allowing accrued interest as follows. Interest 
will accrue on the total amount of the mortgage 
indebtedness, including foreclosure costs and attorney 
fees as determined by the decree of foreclosure, from 
March 11, 1981 [the date of the decree] to the date of the 
sale, April 1, 1981, at the statutory rate of eight percent 
per annum in accordance with former I.C. § 28-22-1 04(4}. 
See, e.g., Beeler v. American Trust Co.! 28 Cal.2d 435, 170 
P.2d 439 (1946); Schmisseurv. Rebhan, 294 III.App. 172, 
13 N.E.2d 627 (1938) and Hudson City Sav. Bank v. 
Hampton Gardens, Ltd .. 88 N.J. 16,438 A.2d 323 (1981). 
Compare Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian 
Inv., 60 Hawaii 413.591 P.2d 104 (1979). The amount of 
the mortgage indebtedness should be adjusted by 
deducting, as of the date of sale, (as determined in the 
decree of foreclosure), the "reasonable value" of the 
property. The amount then remaining will continue to 
bear interest from the date of sale at the rate of eight 
percent per annum to the date the original deficiency 
judgment was entered, May 22. 1981. The total amount 
found due in the deficiency jUdgment, including 
allowable costs of the sale, if any, will thereafter bear 
interest at the applicable judgment rate. 
Thompson, 106 Idaho at 183-84,677 P.2d at 496-97 (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Thompson, the rate of interest until the date of the decree 
of foreclosure, March 11,2081, was calculated at the contract rate of 12% 
per annum ("prejudgment contract interest rate"). Id. at 178, 677 P .2d at 
492. The rate of interest from the date of the decree of foreclosure to the 
date of sale, April 1 , 1981, was calculated at the then statutory rate of 8% 
per annum pursuant to former Idaho Code § 28-22-1 04(4) ("post judgment 
statutory interest rate"). Id. The rate of interest from the date of the sale 
to the date of the deficiency judgment, May 22, 1981, was then calculated 
at the post judgment statutory interest rate pursuant to former Idaho Code 
§ 28-22104(4}. Id. at 106 Idaho at 183-84, 677 P.2d at 496-97. The rate 
of interest from the date of the deficiency was then calculated at the post 
judgment statutory interest rate in effect at the time of the subsequent 
judgment. Id. at 106 Idaho at 184, 677 P.2d at 497. 
Here, Plaintiffs seek to have the Sheriff and Clerk collect interest at 
a rate interest in excess of the post judgment statutory interest rate set 
forth in Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2}. As set forth in Thompson, the law in 
Idaho is clear. the rate of interest on a judiCial foreclosure shall accrue 
from the date of the judgment or decree at the post judgment statutory 
interest rate in accordance with Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2}. None of the 
authorities cited by Plaintiffs provide that Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2} does 
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not apply to a decree or judgment arising out of the judicial foreclosure of 
a mortgage or deed of trust. 
Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of 
Hearing, pp. 2-4. The Court finds everything written by counsel for the Sheriff and Clerk 
of Court to be accurate. Counsel for the Sheriff and Clerk of Court then correctly point 
out this has all been decided by the same judge, with the same counsel in June, 2010. 
Id., p. 4. 
In that June 1, 2010, decision by this Court in those cases, this Court stated 
Idaho law is well-settled that pre-judgment interest may be set by an agreement or by 
statute when damages are liquidated, but interest from the time of judgment until the 
judgment is paid in full "accrues at the legal rate set forth in I.C. § 28-22-104(2)." Id., p. 
3. That decision, in its entirety, is as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. 
The above five cases are not consolidated. All five cases have a 
common defendant, Stacy Akana (Akana). In all five cases, there is a 
"judgment", thus, Akana is now a judgment debtor in each of the cases. 
The type or "quality" of "judgment" in each of the five cases varies. 
All five cases have different plaintiffs, with some overlapping 
plaintiffs, but all plaintiffs in all five cases are represented by the same 
attorney, John Finney. Case No. CV 2009 9784 was originally assigned to 
District Judge Mitchell. Case No. CV 2009 7094 and CV 2009 5323 were 
originally assigned to District Judge Hosack who retired and had his 
caseload assigned to District Judge Ben Simpson. Case No. CV 2009 
7384, and CV 20099784 were originally assigned to District Judge Lansing 
Haynes. 
A question was raised by the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, 
Civil Division, regarding the interest rate stated in the various judgments 
and the interest rate mentioned in the various decrees of sale. For 
expediency and judicial efficiency, all have been reassigned to 
Administrative District Judge Mitchell. 
II. ANALYSIS. 
as: 
At oral argument held on May 10, 2010, Finney framed the issue 
The Sheriff's office's concern is they see the word judgment and 
they say a judgment can only accrue interest at a "judgment rate" 
pursuant to statute, but what we actually have in my clients' opinion 
is a decree of sale that takes a debt and provides for a remedy 
being the sheriff's sale of the piece of property and it's not until that 
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sale of the property, until there's actually a resolution or a 
satisfaction of a portion of that debt. So the issue is does 
the ... note, rate of interest continue through the [d]ate of sale or 
does the judgment that provides for the sale, a decree of sale, 
does that then switch it from a note rate of interest to a rate of 
interest on a judgment... section at issue is 28-22-104. 
This frames the issue properly. The question for this Court is which rate 
of interest applies up to the date of the judgment, and which rate applies 
between the date of the judgment and the date of the sale. A judgment 
has been entered in each of these cases, but no sale has taken place. 
However, the decrees of sale indicate the interest rate as specified in the 
note apply. 
What is confusing here is that, for purposes of a deficiency 
judgment, interest accrues from the date of the sale pursuant to I.C. § 45-
1512. Finney argues the pre-judgment interest based on the notes and 
deeds of trust applies until the sheriffs sale takes place. He states any 
deficiency judgment would be reduced to a simple money judgment 
which, in turn, would then be subject to interest at the statutory rate on 
judgments. 
However, interest accrues at the rate set forth in the applicable 
debt instrument until judgment. In Idaho, these pre-judgment interest 
amounts can be allowed by an agreement in contract or by statute only 
where damages are liquidated. Bouten Construction Co. v. H.F. 
Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,761,992, P.2d 751,756 (1999) citing 
Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist., No.2, 128 Idaho 805,814,919 P.2d 
334, 343 (1996). "It is settled law in Idaho that pre-judgment interest is 
available only when damages are liquidated or are ascertainable by mere 
mathematical process." Id. Interest from the time of judgment until 
judgment is paid in full accrues at the legal rate set forth in I.C. § 28-22-
104(2). Bouten, 133 Idaho 756,759, 992 P.2d 751, 764. 
Unreported cases may help clarify this distinction. See U.S. v. 
Rice, 1986 WL 15624 (S.D. Ohio, March 4, 1986) ("The Court further finds 
that there is due to plaintiff from defendants Theodore K. Butler and Linda 
S. Butler, jointly and severally, on the Promissory Note set out in the 
Complaint the sum of $8,951.03, with interest on the principal balance of 
$8,003.82 at the rate of $1.31 per day from December 1, 1985, through 
the date of judgment. with interest thereafter at the legal rate, and any 
authorized expenses incurred by the plaintiff chargeable to said 
defendants under the terms of said Promissory Note and related 
Mortgage Deed or as otherwise provided by law, through the date of 
sale."); Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Heiser and American Bank, 36 
Pa.D.&C.3d 115, 120 (Pa.Com.PI. 1985) (Having concluded that the Farm 
Credit Act does not preempt 42 Pa.C.S. § 8108, we hold that Federal 
Land Bank is entitled to interest on its judgment at the rate of six percent 
per annum, or a total of $7,330.14 for the period between the entry of 
judgment and the Sheriff's sale. Inasmuch as the Sheriffs proposed 
schedule of distribution awards Federal Land Bank an amount in excess 
of that figure, American Bank's exception is sustained."); In re Donaldson, 
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43 B.R. 506, 507 (Bkrtcy.S.D., 1984) ("Because this was a foreclosure by 
action and Federal Land Bank's claim was reduced to judgment, it is 
entitled to 18% interest- the statutory rate at the time- from the date of 
judgment to the date of sale.") 
Thus, the various plaintiffs in the instant actions are entitled to the 
interest and late fees, etc., at the rate of interest contemplated in their 
agreement up to the date of the Judgments being entered. Thereafter, 
the rate accrues at the statutory rate on judgments until paid by sheriff's 
sale and/or deficiency judgment. Pursuant to I.C. § 45-1512, a deficiency 
judgment accrues interest at the statutory rate as set forth in I.C. § 28-22-
104(2). 
The next issue is whether there truly is a "judgment" in each of 
these cases. "[U]ntil a final judgment has been entered, an order granting 
summary judgment is an interlocutory order and subject to reconsideration 
pursuantto I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Puckettv. Verska, 144 Idaho 161,166, 
158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007), citing Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. David Steed & 
Assocs., 121 Idaho 356,361,825, P.2d 79, 84 (1992). Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b)(1) reads: 
(1) Certificate of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon 
one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties 
shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or parties, 
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
As such, these cases did not involve the Court's adjudicating less than all 
the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties. It follows 
that an Order granting summary judgment as to all claims made and all 
parties involved is a final order. In M & H Rentals, Inc. v. Sales, 108 
Idaho 567, 569,700 P.2d 970, 972 (Ct.App. 1985), the Court of Appeals 
deemed the judgment at issue to be final for purposes of appealibility, 
although it adjudicated less than all claims asserted in the lawsuit, 
because it was "the last in a series and it disposes of all remaining claims 
leaving none pending." Id. The Court noted Rule 54(b) is designed to 
prevent piecemeal appellate litigation and does not apply to a judgment 
which leaves no claims undecided. Id. 
Thus, substantively, because all of plaintiffs' rights and liabilities 
were adjudicated in the Judgment filed in each case (except CV 2009 
9784 where no Judgment has as yet been entered), the Court's 
Judgments created a final judgment in each case. 
The next question is procedurally, is the Judgment a final 
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"judgment". Idaho case law and the Idaho Rules of Procedure have 
determined this issue: 
In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., this Court defined a final judgment 
as "an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the 
subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final 
determination of the rights of the parties. It must be a separate 
document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." 137 
Idaho 850, 867, 55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002) (internal citations 
omitted). We further stated in In re Universe Life Insurance Co., 
that "[a]n order granting summary judgment does not 
constitute a judgment." 1144 Idaho at 756, 171 P.3d at 247. In 
addition, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) requires: "Every 
judgment shall be set forth in a separate document." 
T.J. T., Inc., a Washington corporation, v. Ulysses, No. 35079-2010, 2010 
WL 1491424, 2010 Opinion No. 41, Supreme Court Docket No. 35079, 
Slip Opinion p. 1 (Idaho April 15, 2010) (emphasis added). Analyzing just 
that language, this Court's "Summary Judgment and Decree of Sale" in 
CV 2009 5323 and CV 2009 5535, and this Court's "Judgments" in CV 
2009 2009 7094and CV 2009 7384 " ... adjudicates the subject matter of 
the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the 
parties", those documents "end the lawsuit", and those documents are "a 
separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." 
(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court in T.J. T. went on to state: 
'The judgment must be a separate document that does not contain the 
trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." T.J. T., Inc., a Washington 
corporation, v. Ulysses, No. 35079-2010, 2010 WL 1491424, 2010 
Opinion No. 41, Supreme Court Docket No. 35079, Slip Opinion p. 1 
(Idaho April 15, 2010), citing Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., 
LLD, No. 35349-2008,2010 WL 309004, Slip Opinion, p. 4. In the 
present case, in this Court's "Summary Judgment and Decree of Sale" in 
CV 2009 5323 and CV 2009 5535, and this Court's "Judgments" in CV 
2009 2009 7094and CV 2009 7384 are "a separate order that does not 
contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." 
There is confusion between Goodman Oil, Goodman Oil Co. v. 
Scotty's Dura-Built Generator, Inc., 2010 WL 3667704 (February 3, 2010) 
and the substitute opinion in T.J. T. In Spokane Structures, just as in 
Goodman Oil (2010 WL 3667704, Slip Opinion, p. 4), 2004), the Idaho 
Supreme Court set forth its mea culpa as to the "confusion" its decisions 
have created: 
Unfortunately, this Court has at times contributed to the confusion 
by focusing upon whether the document "adjudicates the subject 
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of 
the rights of the parties," Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,641, 
991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999), without also requiring that it be "a 
separate document" that "grant[s] the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled," I.R.C.P. Rules 58 (a) & 54(c). 
Spokane Structures, No. 35349-2008,2010 WL 309004, Slip Opinion, p. 
5. This Court has read Goodman Oil, T.J. T., Spokane Structures, and 
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Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co. This Court concludes that these cases, 
taken together, require the following in order for there to be a "final 
Judgment" or a "final order" in the present case: 
1) There must be a "separate document" (Camp, T.J. T., Spokane 
Structures); 
2) [that separate document] does not contain the trial court's legal 
reasoning and analysis (Spokane Structures, T.J. T.), 
3) [that separate document] does state: 
a) the relief granted or denied (i.e., in the present case, 
granting plaintiffs all amounts sought) (Spokane Structures, T.J. T., 
Camp); and 
b) that this is a final determination of the rights of the parties 
(Goodman, T.J. T., Camp, Spokane Structures) 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Spokane Structures stated: 
The "relief to which the party ... is entitled" must be read in 
conjunction with other rules. Rule 8(a)(1) provides, "A pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain ... (2) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled." The "demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled" obviously refers to the relief that 
the party seeks in the lawsuit. For example, neither the Builder in 
his complaint nor the landowner in its answer prayed for the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment. In this case, the relief 
sought by Builder was either specific performance of the 
Design/Build Agreement or damages, and the relief sought by 
Landowner was dismissal of Builder's complaint. The relief to 
which a party is entitled is the specific redress or remedy that the 
court determines the party should receive in the litigation, or with 
respect to a claim for relief in the litigation. 
Spokane Structures, No. 35349-2008, 2010 WL 309004, Slip Opinion, pp. 
4-5. 
For the reasons set forth above, a final judgment has been entered 
in each case. The problem is the interest calculation is wrong. 
In CV 20095323, Roesch and Romey v. Akana et al., the plaintiffs 
have a Judgment against defendants North Idaho Credit entered on 
September 10, 2009, and filed on September 11, 2009, where North Idaho 
Credit disclaims any interest. That Judgment is not at issue. In CV 2009 
5323, Roesch and Romey v. Akana et al., the plaintiffs also have a 
"Summary Judgment and Decree of Sale" entered December 4,2009, and 
filed December 8, 2009, entered following a November 24, 2009, hearing 
on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. That Summary Judgment and 
Decree of Sale provides plaintiffs judgment against Akana in the amount of 
$119,524.66 as of September 8,2009, " ... plus $35.753 per diem thereafter 
until the date ofthe sale decreed herein, plus late fees of $108.75 per 
month until the date of sale, plus attorney fees and costs to the date of sale, 
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determined by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Summary Judgment 
and Decree of Sale, p. 2. (underlining in original). It is the underlined 
portion which is incorrect. If the judgment amount was $119,524.66 as of 
September 8, 2009, then the interest rate of 5.625% on judgments 
applicable under I.C. § 28-22-104, would amount to $18.41 per day 
($6,723.2621/year divided by 365 days = $18.419896/day). Late fees are 
no longer available post judgment. 
In CV 20095535, Ronan Telephone Co. et al. v. Akana, and North 
Idaho Credit, Corp., the plaintiffs have a Judgment against defendant North 
Idaho Credit dated July 31,2009, and entered August 3,2009. That 
Judgment was reached via stipulation. That Judgment simply terminates 
their right, title and interest in the real property. Thus, that Judgment is not 
at issue. In CV 2009 5535, Ronan Telephone Co. et al. v. Akana, et 
al., plaintiffs also have a "Summary Judgment and Decree of Sale" 
Judgment, entered November 12, 2009, filed November 13, 2009, following 
hearing on summary judgment held on November 12, 2009, against Akana, 
upon a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, for a total of 
" ... $519,109.83 as of September 18,2009, "plus $156.154 per diem 
thereafter until the date of sale decreed herein, plus late fees of $475.00 
per month until the date off sale, plus attorney fees and costs to the date of 
sale, to be determined pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Sale, pp. 2-3. (underlining added). It is 
the underlined portion which is incorrect. If the judgment amount was 
$519,109.83 as of September 18, 2009, then the interest rate of 5.625% on 
judgments applicable under I.C. § 28-22-104, would amount to $79.99 per 
day ($29,199.9927/year divided by 365 days = $79.9998/day). 
In CV 2009 7094, Roesch v. Akana, et al., the plaintiffs have a 
Judgment against defendant North Idaho Credit Corp., that was entered 
October 16, 2009, and filed on October 20,2009. That Judgment was 
reached via stipulation. That Judgment simply terminates that corporation's 
right, title and interest in a note and deed of trust. Thus, that Judgment is 
not at issue. In CV 2009 7094, Roesch v. Akana, et al., plaintiffs also have 
a Judgment, entered November 24,2009, filed November 27,2009, taken 
by default, against Akana upon a $87,000 promissory note secured by a 
deed of trust, for a total of $194,881.13 as of November 18, 2009"plus 
$63.699 per diem to sale as a lien with a priority date of April 20, 2005, 
which is hereby foreclosed against the following real property ... " Judgment, 
p. 3. (underlining added). It is the underlined portion which is incorrect. If 
the judgment amount was $194,881.13 as of November 18, 2009, then the 
interest rate of 5.625% on judgments applicable under I.C. § 28-22-104, 
would amount to $30.03 per day ($10,962.063 divided by 365 days = 
$30.033049/day). A Writ of Execution was entered by the Clerk of Court on 
April 1, 2010, in the amounts set forth in the November 24, 2009, 
Judgment. 
In CV 2009 7384, Boone et al v. Akana, et al., the plaintiffs have a 
Judgment against defendants Rollman and defendant K&B Investments 
LLC that was entered October 1, 2009, and filed on October 5, 2009. That 
Judgment was reached via stipulation. That Judgment simply terminates 
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their right, title and interest in a note and deed of trust. Thus, that Judgment 
is not at issue. In CV 20097384, Boone et al v. Akana, et al., plaintiffs also 
have a Judgment, entered November 4, 2009, filed November 6, 2009, 
taken by default, against Akanas upon a $350,000 promissory note secured 
by a deed of trust, for a total of $439,922.40 as of October 9,2009 "plus 
$143.836 per diem to sale as a lien with a priority date of May 2,2007, 
which is hereby foreclosed against the following real property ... " Judgment, 
p. 2. (underlining added). It is the underlined portion which is incorrect. If 
the judgment amount was $439,922.40 as of October 9,2009, then the 
interest rate of 5.625% on judgments applicable under I.C. § 28-22-104, 
would amount to $67.79 per day ($24,745.63 divided by 365 days = 
$67.79626/day). 
Finally, in CV 2009 9784, Downes et al v. Akana, the plaintiffs have 
a Judgment against defendants North Idaho Credit Corp, via stipulation, 
entered March 2, 2009, and filed March 3, 2009. That Judgment simply 
terminates the right, title and interest of that corporation, and accordingly, is 
not at issue. In CV 2009 9784, Downes et al v. Akana, plaintiffs have filed 
for default against Akana, in the amount of "$207,697.19, owed to May 13, 
2010", "plus $55.479 per day until the date of Sheriffs sale." Affidavit of 
Amount Due, p. 2. (emphasis in original). If the Judgment amount is 
$207,697.19 as of May 13,2010, then the interest rate of 5.625% on 
judgments applicable under I.C. § 28-22-104, would amount to 
$32.008126/day ($11 ,682. 966/year divided by 365 days = 
$32.008126/day). 
III. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that counsel for Plaintiffs in all these 
actions submit new corrected proposed Judgments in each case, against 
Stacy Akana (and in CV 20097384 against Roni Akana as well), with the 
correct interest figure, as set forth in this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
In CV 20099784, since no Judgment has been signed by the Court, a new 
proposed Judgment will need to be filed with the correct interest figure as 
set forth in this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 1-12. 
Thus, in the present case, the contract rate of interest applies only through the 
date of Judgment. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' argument in the present case is that the 
statutory judgment rate of interest does not begin to apply until after the sheriff's sale. 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 4. Plaintiffs 
write: 
The Sheriff's Departments [sic] assertion fails to recognize that in a foreclosure, 
the Court adjudicates the indebtedness and orders a sale of the security from 
which to apply the sale proceeds to the indebtedness. The indebtedness 
accrues interest pursuant to the debt instrument through sale. That is "the 
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amount due the plaintiff." The Court's order to sell does not convert the 
indebtedness to a judgment upon which judgment interest accrues. 
Id., p. 4. This is simply a repackaged argument from the one submitted by the same 
attorney in 2010. This repackaged argument flies in the face of the above quote from 
the Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Thompson: "The decree of foreclosure provides 
the cut off date for fixing the amount of the mortgage indebtedness." 1 06 Idaho 177, 
182-83,677 P.2d 490, 495-96. 
In Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616,226 P.3d 
1263 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court defined final judgments as: 
'" an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject 
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the 
rights of the parties. It must be a separate document that on its face 
states the relief granted or denied. 
148 Idaho 616,620,226 P.3d 1263, 1267, quoting Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 
Idaho 850,867,55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002). The Judgment and Decree of Sale, filed 
August 30, 2012, in the present case, is a final judgment within the meaning of 
Spokane Structures. 
It is plaintiffs' contention that, until a deficiency judgment is entered, no final 
judgment upon which judgment interest accrues exists. Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 6. In support, plaintiffs in the present case 
cite Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 247 P.751 (1926). Specifically, counsel for 
plaintiffs writes: "As set forth in Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 561 [,247 P. 751, 752] 
(1926), '[a] decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is in no sense a personal judgment, 
and no personal judgment can be entered until after the foreclosure sale.'" Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 6. That argument of 
plaintiffs' counsei based on that sentence from Perkins ignores the context of which it 
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was written by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perkins, and it ignores the facts of Perkins. 
Most importantly, such argument ignores obvious fact that Perkins concerned a decree 
of foreclosure (with no mention of any judgment), where in the present case plaintiffs 
have a "Judgment and Decree of Sale", where "Judgment is hereby ordered and 
decreed as follows:". Judgment and Decree of Sale, p. 1. Perkins is inapposite to the 
instant matter. 
The facts of Perkins are as follows. In 1919, E. Bundy borrowed $10,000 from 
Waldrop, and Waldrop took promissory notes from E. Bundy. 42 Idaho 560,563,247 
P. 751,751. Waldrop assigned $8,000 of those notes to Perkins. Id. To secure those 
notes, E. Bundy also signed a real estate mortgage upon lands E. Bundy held under 
certificate of sale by the State of Idaho as they were school lands leased by the State, 
along with improvements. Id. In 1922, DeWitt Bundy, E. Bundy's son, obtained a 
judgment against E. Bundy for eleven years of past wages, which E. Bundy let DeWitt 
Bundy have without contest. 42 Idaho 560, 563, 247 P. 751,752. In 1923, Perkins and 
Waldrop procured a decree of foreclosure under their real estate mortgage, decreeing 
that all property sold under the mortgage be sold under the lien, but had yet to execute 
on that decree of foreclosure. Id. It is important to note that the Idaho Supreme Court 
at this point in Perkins makes no mention that the decree of foreclosure specified any 
amount due by E. Bundy to Perkins and Waldrop, and makes no mention of the word 
"judgment". DeWitt Bundy then obtained a writ of execution upon his judgment against 
E. Bundy, and sought sheriff's sale. Perkins and Waldrop then sued E. Bundy and 
DeWitt Bundy claiming DeWitt Bundy's judgment was collusively suffered and obtained 
in fraud of creditors, those creditors specifically being Perkins and Waldrop. 42 Idaho 
560, 562, 247 P. 751, 751. Perkins and Waldrop sought to enjoin the sheriff's sale that 
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DeWitt Bundy was attempting. 42 Idaho 560, 562-63, 247 P. 751, 751. The district 
court set aside DeWitt Bundy's judgment and enjoined the sheriff's sale. 42 Idaho 560, 
564,247 P. 751,752. DeWitt Bundy appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found there 
was evidence of fraud, but reversed the district court on different grounds. Those 
grounds were the fact that Perkins and Waldrop had not reduced their decree of 
foreclosure to a judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court in Perkins wrote: 
So far at least as the complaint seeks relief against the sale of 
property not included in the terms of the mortgage, this objection is good. 
It is elementary that, in general, until the creditor has reduced his 
claim to judgment, at least in the absence of a lien upon the property 
alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed, he cannot maintain an action 
to set aside his debtor's conveyance as fraudulent (Sewell v. Price, 164 
Cal. 265,128 P. 407; Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635, 35 P. 433,38 
Am. St. Rep. 314; O'Day v. Ambaum, 47 Wash. 684, 92 P. 421, 15 L. R. 
A. [N. S.] 484; Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances [3d Ed.] p. 533, et seq.); 
nor can he maintain an action to restrain a debtor from disposing of his 
property (O'Oay v. Ambaum, supra; Brumbaugh v. Jones, 70 Neb. 786,98 
N. W. 54; 2 Moore on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 1041; Bump on 
Fraudulent Conveyances [3d Ed.] p. 527). 
A decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is in no sense a personal 
judgment, and no personal judgment can be entered until after the 
foreclosure sale (C. S. § 6949; Barnes v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 6 Idaho, 519, 
57 P. 267); and prior to the entry of a deficiency judgment, such action 
cannot be maintained by a mortgagor (Cotes v. Bennett, 183 III. 82, 55 N. 
E. 661). The complaint is insufficient to entitle plaintiffs to relief as to 
personal property which is not described in plaintiffs' mortgage. 
42 Idaho 560, 564-65,247 P. 751,752. Thus, Perkins is distinguishable on several 
grounds. First, and foremost, there is no mention that Perkins and Waldrop had any 
sort of a "judgment"; all Perkins and Waldrop had was a decree of foreclosure. In the 
present case, plaintiffs clearly have a "judgment" as soon as the Judgment and Decree 
of Sale signed by this Court on August 29, 2011, was filed on August 30, 2011. That 
Judgment and Decree of Sale sets forth a specific amount that plaintiffs are due by 
defendants. Second, Perkins termed the interest in the lease State school land as 
"personal property", where the present case deals with a real property interest. Third, 
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Perkins dealt with the right of a party who only has a decree of foreclosure, to set aside 
a second party's recorded real estate mortgage, based on fraud of the second party, 
where the instant case simply deals with when and what interest rates apply. 
What plaintiffs' attorney in the present case fails to realize (or at least 
consciously chooses to ignore) is that Perkins deals not with the question of whether a 
plaintiff who has not yet obtained a deficiency judgment under a foreclosure decree can 
be a creditor entitled to maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by a 
mortgagor, but rather deals with the question of whether a plaintiff who has not yet 
obtained any judgment under a foreclosure decree can be a creditor entitled to maintain 
an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by a mortgagor. 42 Idaho 560, 561, 247 
P. 751, 752. 
Plaintiffs next cite Isaak v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 907,811 P.2d 
832 (1991), for the proposition that a Court must find the correct date for determining 
the value of property sold at a foreclosure sale to be the date the Court determines 
whether a deficiency judgment should be entered. Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 
Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 6. Isaak makes clear that Idaho Code § 6-
108 limits a deficiency judgment to the difference between the mortgage indebtedness 
determined by the decree (plus foreclosure and sale costs) and the value of the 
property determined by the court upon the taking of evidence. 119 Idaho 907,909,811 
P.2d 832, 834; quoting I.C. § 6-108. In Isaak, the Supreme Court found the correct 
date for determining the value of the property at issue "would have been the date when 
the trial court in a foreclosure case determined whether a deficiency judgment should 
be entered pursuant to I.C. § 6-108." 119 Idaho 907, 910, 811 P.2d 832, 835. While 
plaintiffs cite isaak for the correct proposition, that proposition does nothing to persuade 
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this Court that it has not taken sufficient evidence to determine whether a judgment 
should have been entered and, if so, in what amount. Plaintiffs have a judgment for an 
amount certain from defendants. Determination of the date to "value of the property" 
set forth in Isaak is not the same issue as determining when a judgment is issued. 
Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App. 1984), discusses the 
differentiation between the statutory and judgment rates of interest. In Camp the Idaho 
Court of Appeals wrote: 
The statute distinguishes between interest on "[m]oney after the 
same becomes due" and "money due on the judgment of any competent 
court or tribunaL .. " Interest on "money after the same becomes due" 
accrues at the rate of 12% while "interest on money due on [a] judgment" 
accrues at 18%. We hold that 12% is the rate applicable to the unpaid 
installments from the time they became due until they were reduced to 
judgment. 
107 Idaho 878, 887, 693 P.2d 1080, 1087. Plaintiffs have had a "judgment" in the 
present case since the Judgment and Decree of Sale was entered on August 30,2011. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the writ of mandamus they seek (or at least sought 
up until 27 minutes before hearing when plaintiffs' counsel withdrew the petition and 
attempted to vacate the hearing). The possibility of a future deficiency judgment is 
speculative at this juncture, and it is the Judgment and Decree of Sale which is the final 
judgment upon which the statutory rate of interest comes into effect. 
Very troubling to the Court is the fact that these are the same arguments raised 
in the joint memorandum decision in the five above cases. If counsel for the plaintiffs in 
the instant case was not satisfied with the outcome in the five cases decided by this 
Court in 2010, his remedy, and the remedy for his several clients' in those previous 
cases, was to appeal the above decision. No appeal was taken from the above 
decision in any of those five cases. 
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In the instant case, in counsel for plaintiffs' "Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 
Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing", counsel for plaintiffs writes: "The decree 
conforms to the applicable foreclosure law (both statutory and case law)." Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 2, ~ 3. That is simply a 
false statement. The decree is not supported by the case law supplied by counsel for 
plaintiffs in the instant case, and the decree is directly contrary to the June 1, 2010, 
decision in the five above cases, involving the same attorney, and two of the five cases 
involving the same plaintiff, Karl L. Roesch. While the June 1, 2010, decision is not 
binding precedent upon this Court or any other district judge, merely because that case 
did not go up on appeal (Robbins v. County of Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 118, 996 P .2d 
833, 818 (2000)), that decision is certainly a clear indication of what this Court 
understands the law to be on this very issue. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 
requires "candor toward the tribunal", specifically, "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... make 
a false statement of fact or law to the tribunaL .. " I.R.P.C.3.3(a)(1). This Court finds 
that rule has been violated by plaintiffs' counsel in the instant case. The comment to 
that rule states: 
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law 
constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to 
make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the 
existence of pertinent legal authorities. 
I.R.C.P. 3.3.(a)(1), comment 4. 
Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or 
fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative 
process, such as ... failing to disclose information to the tribunal when 
required by law to do so. 
LR.C.P. 3.3.(a)(1), comment 12. This Court finds that plaintiffs' counsel's submission of 
a proposed judgment and Decree of Sale and a V"rit of Execution for Sale of Real 
Property, with daily interest amount that was apparent but an interest rate that was not 
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made apparent on either document, and when that interest rate is not in accordance 
with the law, when that interest rate is in direct contravention of a decision of this Court 
involving the same attorney representing one of the same plaintiffs filed twelve months 
earlier, is fraudulent conduct by plaintiffs' counsel, and is dishonest conduct toward the 
tribunal by plaintiffs' counsel. 
Additionally, this Court finds that when counsel for plaintiffs filed the "Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing", and wrote: "The decree 
conforms to the applicable foreclosure law (both statutory and case law)", (Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 2, ~ 3), plaintiffs' counsel 
engaged in fraudulent conduct and dishonest conduct toward the tribunal. Under 
I.R.P.C. 8.3(a), this Court is required to report this ethical violation to the Idaho State 
Bar if this ethical violation " ... raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty." 
"The term 'substantial' refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the 
quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware." I.R.P.C. 8.3(a), comment 3. This 
Court finds the seriousness of this possible offense is that the effective interest rate and 
interest owed by the defendants is essentially doubled as compared to what the interest 
rate and interest owed should legally be. The requirement to report ethical violations 
used to be an "automatic" or absolute requirement, but now, the rule of professional 
conduct " ... limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating 
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent.. .[a] measure of judgment is, therefore, 
required in complying with the provisions of this Rule." I.R.P.C. 8.3(a), comment 3. 
This Court has deliberated long and hard as to whether to report this conduct. 
This Court would prefer nothing more than to come to the conclusion that the 
undersigned did not have that duty to report plaintiffs' counsel to the Idaho State Bar. 
The Court finds such conduct must be reported. Such conduct is "substantial", such 
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conduct was fraudulent and dishonest to the tribunal. Accordingly, a copy of this 
decision is being sent to Idaho State Bar Counsel as the "bar disciplinary agency." 
I.R.P.C. 8.3(a), comment 3. 
This Court has wrestled with whether counsel for plaintiffs' actions were based 
on ignorance, forgetfulness or inadvertence. The first deceptive act of plaintiffs' 
counsel was to present the Judgment and Decree of Sale as worded, when that same 
counsel had tried the very same issue to a contrary result sixteen months earlier. 
Ignorance, forgetfulness or inadvertence went out the window when plaintiffs' counsel 
filed the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, 
because, as mentioned immediately above, plaintiffs' counsel wrote: "The decree 
conforms to the applicable foreclosure law (both statutory and case law)". Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of Hearing, p. 2, 11 3. Any ignorance, 
inadvertence or forgetfulness was further eliminated when counsel for the Sheriff and 
the Clerk of Court edified and refreshed the recollection of plaintiffs' counsel when the 
Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Sheriff and Notice of 
Hearing was filed on January 19, 2012. Still, counsel for plaintiffs did not back down. 
At oral argument on January 31,2012, counsel for plaintiffs argued that in the 
June 2010 decision in the earlier five cases, "this Court did not have my [plaintiffs' 
counsel's] full analysis under Idaho Code § 6-108." As shown above, Idaho Code § 6-
108 does not provide any support to plaintiffs' counsel's stubborn arguments on the 
interest issue. There was not one shred of credible legal argument that counsel for 
plaintiffs added at the January 31,2012, argument in the present case that had not 
already been discussed by plaintiffs' counsel eighteen months earlier when the other 
five cases were decided. 
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Counsel for plaintiffs in the instant case could have appealed the decision 
rendered in the earlier five cases. He did not. Being completely cognizant of the fact 
that eighteen months ago he had fully litigated this issue to this same Court in five 
related cases, some of them involving this same plaintiff that appears in the instant 
case, counsel for plaintiffs in the instant case then could have raised these "new" 
arguments he just discovered regarding Idaho Code § 6-108 in a motion in the instant 
case before presenting a proposed Judgment and Decree of Sale. He did not. 
Instead, counsel for plaintiffs in the instant case chose to present a proposed Judgment 
and Decree of Sale, which had a daily interest amount but did not set forth the 
calculations or the manner in which counsel for plaintiff arrived at that daily interest 
amount. The Court finds that to be an intentional and unacceptable misleading of the 
Court by plaintiffs' counsel. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons set forth above, the extraordinary relief sought by plaintiffs of a 
writ of mandamus must be denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiffs' motion for a writ of mandamus is DENIED. 
IT IS FUTHER ORDERED counsel for plaintiffs' present an amended judgment 
and writ consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for a Writ of Mandamus. The Court has in its possession a proposed Amended 
Judgment and Decree of Sale, submitted by counsel for plaintiffs on January 31,2012, 
after the hearing, and such proposed Amended Judgment and Decree of Sale is not 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for a 
Writ of Mandamus. 
Entered this 14th day of March, 2011. 
hn T. Mitchell, District Judge 
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Case No. CV-2011-3947 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
SALE 
Based on the Memorandum Decision And Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion For A Writ Of Mandamus, entered March 14, 
2012, the Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered August 30, 2011 and 
recorded August 31, 2011 as Instrument No. 2325820000, is hereby 
amended and it is hereby ordered and decreed as follows: 
1. The Defendant, DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man, is 
indebted to the Plaintiffs, KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided 
77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC., as to an 
undivided 22.5% interest (pursuant to an Assignment Of Real 
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Estate Mortgage And Negotiation Of Promissory Note, recorded 
April 12, 2011 as Instrument No. 239493000, records of Kootenai 
County, Idaho) upon a Promissory Note (herein "Note"), dated 
February 13, 2006 in the original principal sum of TWO HUNDRED 
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 00/100 ($200,000.00), secured by Real Estate 
Mortgage (herein "Mortgage") f recorded February 15, 2006 as 
Instrument No. 2013767, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, for a 
total of $307,800.62 as of August 19, 2011 as a lien with a 
priority date of February 15, 2006, which is hereby foreclosed 
against the following real property (herein "Real Property") of 
the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried man: 
A PORTION OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 5, TOWNSHIP 47 
NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, BOISE MERIDIAN, KOOTENAI COUNTY, 
IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1558 FEET (MORE OR LESS) WEST OF 
THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2 OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE SOU'l.'H 1591 FEET MORE OR LESS TO A POINT ON THE 
SOU'l.'H SIDE OF COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS 
IT FROM THE SOU'l.'H; 
THENCE IN A SOU'l.'HERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE METZ ROAD TO 
THE EAST AND WEST QUARTER LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE WEST ALONG THE QUARTER LINE TO THE SOU'l.'HWEST 
CORNER OF THE SOU'l.'HEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE WEST LINE OF THE SOU'l.'HEAST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER AND CONTINUING ALONG 
THE WEST LINE OF LOT 3 OF SAID SECTION 5 TO THE NORTH 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG SAID NORTH LINE OF SAID LOT 3, 1082 
FEET, MORE OR LESS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO BEGINNING AT THE SOU'l.'HEAST CORNER OF THE SOU'l.'HWEST 
QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH ALONG THE CENTER LINE OF THE NORTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 5, A DISTANCE OF 2538.6 FEET, 
MORE OR LESS; 
THENCE WEST 1558 FEET; 
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THENCE SOUTH 1591 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF 
THE COUNTY ROAD WHERE THE METZ ROAD INTERSECTS IT FROM 
THE SOUTH; 
THENCE IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE EAST SIDE OF 
THE METZ ROAD TO A POINT ON THE EAST AND WEST CENTER 
LINE OF SAID SECTION 5; 
THENCE EAST ALONG THE SAID CENTERLINE 1174 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS, TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY THE EAST 
720 FEET THEREOF. 
ALSO EXCEPT THAT PORTION LYING WEST OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED LINE: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF 
SECTION 5, THAT IS 1931.38 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 18'59" 
EAST FROM THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5, 
MARKED BY AN OLD RECOGNIZED 1 INCH IRON PIPE; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 04' 44" WEST, 2657.44 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE NORTH BOUNDARY OF SECTION 5; 
THENCE NORTH 89 DEGREES 55' 48" EAST, 437.00 FEET TO THE 
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING OF THE HEREIN DESCRIBED LINE; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 04' 40" WEST, 2663.19 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE EAST-WEST CENTERLINE OF THE SECTION AND THE 
TERMINUS OF SAID LINE. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP 80 FEET WIDE OVER PART OF THE EAST 
HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER, WHICH WAS DEEDED TO THE 
STATE OP IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED 
FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT PAGE 241. 
ALSO EXCEPT A STRIP OF VARIABLE WIDTH OVER PART OF LOT 3, 
THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER AND LOT 2, 
WHICH WAS DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 7, 1935 IN BOOK 102 AT 
PAGE 242. 
2. The Plaintiffs' lien has priority over any right, 
title, claim, interest, encumbrance, or liens recorded subsequent 
to it and any subsequent lien holder'S rights, claims, and/or 
interests in the real property are inferior to that of the 
Plaintiffs' respective liens, specifically including the 
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Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. and the Defendant SHEA 
REALTORS, PLLC. 
3. The Plaintiffs pursuant to the Mortgage have a first 
priority security interest as of the date of recording of 
February 15, 2006. 
4. The Plaintiffs are awarded a decree of sale of the Real 
Property with a priority date of February 15, 2006 upon the 
Mortgage, upon a Sheriff's foreclosure sale in the manner of an 
execution sale, and upon becoming the successful bidder(s) to 
have possession thereof subject only to the statutory provisions 
of redemption, and to have an application of the proceeds of sale 
to the payment of costs and expenses of sale, and then to the 
amount due the Plaintiffs, and then pursuant to statutory 
priority to the Defendant CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. and the 
Defendant SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, if any, and in the event of 
deficiency, for a money judgment against the Defendant DANIEL L. 
KLEMANN, an unmarried man. 
5. The statutory rate of interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 
28-22-104(2) of 5.250% applies to the total indebtedness in the 
sum of $307,800.62 as of August 19, 2011 at the rate of $44.27 
per diem thereafter. 
DATED this c2 O~ day of 2012, nunc pro tunc 
to August 19, 2011. 
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CLERK'S RULE 77 (d) SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy, with the 
clerk's filing stamp thereon showing the date of filing, of the 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SALE was served by deposit in 
First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~ day of :J/J2A~ 
2012, and was addressed as follows: 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Daniel Klemann 
284 E. River Rock Road 
Belgrade, Montana 59714 
Shea Realtors, PLLC 
c/o Gary Shea, Registered Agent 
1900 Harrison Avenue 
Butte, Montana 59701 
Cornerstone Financial, Inc. 
c/o Eric Nord, Receiver 
Crist, Krogh & Nord, LLC 
The Securities Building 
2708 First Avenue North, Suite 300 
Billings, Montana 59101 
Kootenai County Prosecutor's Civil Division 
Attn: Darrin Murphey 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
By: 
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JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
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TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants KARL L. ROESCH, as to an 
undivided 77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC., as to 
an undivided 22.5% interest, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Amended Judgment and Decree Of Foreclosure, entered in 
the above entitled action on March 20, 2012, the Honorable John 
T. ~tchell, District Judge, presiding. Said Amended Judgment 
And Decree Of Foreclosure is considered a final judgment by the 
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District Judge and this appeal is filed as a precaution. The 
Appellants consider the Amended Judgment And Decree Of 
Foreclosure (and the Judgment And Decree Of Foreclosure 
previously entered August 30, 2011) as not being a final judgment 
subject to appeal, as the claim for relief for a deficiency 
judgment is not entered until following the foreclosure sale. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgment described in paragraph 1 above is 
appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a) (1), I.A.R, if in fact 
a final judgment. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which 
the Appellants intend to assert in the appeal; provided, any such 
list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from 
asserting other issues on appeal, include: 
(a) Did the District Court err in its setting of the 
rate of interest in a foreclosure action accruing between the 
order of sale and the actual sheriff's sale date to be held? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of 
the record? NO. If so, what portion? N/A. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES. (a) 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript in BOTH hard copy 
and electronic format: The reporter's transcript regarding the 
hearing held January 31, 2012 by the Court. 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically 
included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All filings in the matter, 
including but not l~ited to the Writ Of Execution For Sale Of 
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Real Property issued September 13, 2011. 
7. The appellants request the following documents, charts, 
or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent 
to the Supreme Court: N/A (none). 
8 . I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been 
served on the reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as 
named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Julie Foland 
324 W. Garden Ave 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid 
the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript in 
the sum of $200.00; 
(c) That the clerk of the district court has been paid 
the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record in the sum 
of $100.00; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid in the 
amount of $101.00. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties 
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated this ~~y of March, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoin~~were served by deposit in U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 
this Z4~r-day of March, 2012 and were addressed to: 
Daniel Klemann 
284 E. River Rock Road 
Belgrade, MOntana 59714 
Shea Realtors, PLLC 
c/o Gary Shea, Registered Agent 
1900 Harrison Avenue 
Butte, MOntana 59701 
Cornerstone Financial, Inc. 
c/o Eric Nord, Receiver 
Crist, Krogh & Nord, LLC 
The Securities Building 
2708 First Avenue North, Suite 300 
Billings, Montana 59101 
Kootenai County Prosecutor's Civil Division 
Attn: Darrin Murphey 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Julie Foland, Court Reporter 
324 W. Garden Ave 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Julie . Foland 
Official Court Report~IfA1el?J~~9 I 
324 West Garden Ave600tfTf.QJ~tli A I r SS 
Coeur d'Alene, IdlittW816-9000 
Phone: (208) 446-1130 
Email: jfola~~u25 PH 4: 22 
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(DANIEL L. KLEMANN 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on April 25,2012, I lodged a transcript 
of 22 pages in length, including the January 31,2012, Hearing, for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Kootenai in the First Judicial District. 
JULIE K. FOLAND 
April 25, 2012 
70 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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CASE NO. 39836-2012 
1, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full and correct copy of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys from the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the 
Clerk's Record was complete and ready for pick up, or ifl~1r,ttorney is out of town, the 
copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the .:.1 day of May, 2012. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have her~~~ set my hand affixed the seal of said Court at 
Kootenai County, Idaho, this ~ day of May, 2012. 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided 
77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
120 East Lake Street, Ste. 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
DANIEL KLEMANN 
ProSe 
284 E River Road 
Belgrade, MT 59714 
IN WITN.ES"S WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal ofthe 
said Court this ~ day of May, 2012. 
